Tag: House of Commons

How to enact remote voting for the Canadian House of Commons

The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) is meeting to study how to enact remote voting for the Canadian House of Commons.  Meetings can be viewed on video (ParlVU).

See List of Meetings below.

For details of the specific language of the request for the study, see later section Government Request.

With the disclaimer that I don’t read every single line of Hansard, I gather the Government’s request passed on May 26, 2020.

So the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, otherwise known as PROC, is charged to produce a report on enacting remote voting by June 23, 2020, which is very little time indeed to gather evidence and analyse it.

UPDATE 2020-06-18: PROC has requested that the deadline for the report be extended from June 23, 2020 to July 21, 2020.  END UPDATE

They have already produced a report recommending a “secure electronic voting system” by which they presumably mean Internet voting.  I examined some of the issues they will need to consider in detail in my previous blog post.

It’s not clear the extent to which they understand the amount of effort that will be needed, given the complexity of implementing a remote voting system with robust authentication in a Canadian context with the technology we actually have in place, as the discussion on the previous report included statements such as:

I think this section [on remote voting], given the recommendation, is really substantiated by the U.K. Parliament and how quickly it moved to implement an electronic remote voting procedure.

What’s interesting about the things that I think are really relevant is that Karen Bradley is quoted in that letter. I would recommend that this quote appear in our report. She said, “The Committee is satisfied with the assurances it has been given about the security of the system.”

Also, I did a bunch of Google searching—

The UK uses a completely different technology infrastructure than Canada, their Parliamentary votes are conducted differently, and they have a dedicated Parliamentary technology team, the Parliamentary Digital Service. The situations are not interchangeable.

As I’ve said in my previous post:

There really needs to be a separate, dedicated, technology-focused report just on electronic voting (Internet voting) for the House of Commons that gives more specific guidance including an assessment of risks and risk mitigations.

As I indicated in my post about the UK system, you have to consider a variety of complex issues when introducing a voting system.

Considerations for a voting system include the chain-of-custody, as multiple systems are most likely involved with the transmission and counting of the vote, concerns about auditability and concerns about security, as well as usability.

So it’s good that there will be a separate report, but there isn’t enough time to do much of an investigation.

At a minimum, PROC needs to consider:

  1. For every voting scenario, how remote voting would work, or if it would not be possible to replicate the attributes of the in-House voting scenario remotely.  (I link to all the different ways a vote can be conducted — Putting the Question as it is called — at the end of this post.)
  2. How to deal with authentication, to reduce the risk that someone other than the Member of Parliament is voting.
  3. Whether they want simultaneous voting, or traditional one-by-one voting.  One-by-one is highly preferable in terms of simplicity and ease of auditing and counting.
  4. How to make the system usable, including reducing the risk of Parliamentarians voting the opposite of the way they intend (it took all of a day for this to happen in the UK).  This can be done by avoiding most additional technology altogether, using the videoconference and having Parliamentarians raise their hands one-by-one to vote.
  5. If they decide they need a software system, considering how to implement the system using modern software development approaches, learning the lessons of previous failed IT systems.
  6. For voting beyond Putting the Question, how to handle other situations.  For example, the Speaker is elected by secret ballot.  This is not possible using online voting, because the anonymity of a secret ballot cannot be replicated online (this is why voting in a general election is not possible online).
  7. How to detect and deal with situations in which the Parliamentarian is voting under duress.

Hopefully their duress solution will be better than the April 2020 U.S. Senate staff report‘s idea:

Another option would be to provide senators with a code word that they could use to make clear to those in the chamber that they were voting under duress.

I would also note that that same staff report indicated:

that system will become a prime target for adversaries … wishing to disrupt the system to undermine confidence in the country’s institutions, or to alter the outcome of significant votes. Therefore, any system the Senate adopts must provide a level of security that would ensure confidence in the validity of senators’ identities and votes similar to that which exists on the Senate floor.

In conducting its analysis PROC will be continuing the Parliamentary Duties and the COVID-19 Pandemic work.

Keeping in mind that remote Parliamentary voting is not at all the same as voting in a general election, most notably because Parliamentary votes are public, with no anonymity and no secret ballot, here is information about Submitting a brief to a Committee:

Guide for submitting briefs to House of Commons Committees

The Clerk of PROC is Justin Vaive, and the email address is PROC@parl.gc.ca

Previous Posts

For more information see my previous posts:

List of Meetings

Government Request – How to Enact Remote Voting

As best I understand, the Government requested on May 25, 2020:

(f) the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs be instructed to review and make recommendations on how to modify the Standing Orders for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic as part of an incremental approach beginning with hybrid sittings of the House as outlined by the report provided to the committee by the Speaker on Monday, May 11, 2020, including how to enact remote voting, provided that (i) the provisions applying to committees enumerated in paragraph (e) shall also apply to the committee, (ii) the committee be instructed to present a report no later than Tuesday, June 23, 2020, (iii) any report which is adopted pursuant to this paragraph may be submitted electronically at any time with the Clerk of the House, and shall be deemed to have been duly presented to the House on that date, (iv) following the presentation of any report pursuant to this paragraph, the House leaders of all four recognized parties may indicate to the Speaker that there is an agreement among the parties to implement one or several of the recommendations of the committee and the Speaker shall give effect to that agreement;

Putting the Question

As one might expect, Bosc and Gagnon provides a detailed explanation of the voting process in the House.

Chapter 12 – The Process of Debate – Decisions of the House – Putting the Question

You can read all the details there, but I have to include the marvelous Figure 12.3 Putting the Question. Law as code, if you will.

Figure 12.3 Putting the Question
Image depicting, in a series of boxes linked by lines, the steps required for the House to make a decision on a question. It begins with debate concluding, followed by the Speaker putting the question, then listing options for voice votes or recorded divisions. If necessary, the Speaker casts a deciding vote. At the end, the Speaker declares that the motion has been adopted or rejected.

(Above section copied from previous blog post.)

Set Up a Secure Electronic Voting System for the Canadian House of Commons, Recommends Procedure and House Affairs Report

I’m going to preface this with a plea: if an electronic voting (Internet voting) system proceeds, please involve computer security, voting system, voting technology, user experience, and web design experts from inside and outside of the government.

Also, for any journalist reporting on this: it does not mean that we could use Internet voting in a general election.  Parliamentary votes are not anonymous and not secret.  Parliamentarians vote by literally standing up in front of everyone else.  It’s a public vote.

I will also mention that in 2016 the ERRE committee already recommended, and in 2017 the government accepted, that there should be no Internet voting in general elections.

In the Parliamentary context, if they wanted to make this simple, they could just have a voice vote over videoconference (one by one, unless you want vocal chaos), or have people hold up their hands one-by-one (with alternatives for people with different abilities), or even have people hold up cards on videoconference that say “Yea” or “Nay”.  It’s nothing like an anonymous secret ballot general election.

Committee Recommendation

On May 15, 2020 the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (“PROC”) released its fifth report of this session: Parliamentary Duties and the COVID-19 Pandemic.  I will focus only on section Discussion – A. Observations and recommendations – ii. Legal and procedural matters – (e) Voting.

Committee recommendations are not binding on the Government; the course of action will depend on the Government’s response.

The Committee therefore recommends:

That the House of Commons set up a secure electronic voting system for conducting votes in virtual sittings as soon as possible in order to guarantee the right of members to vote safely in the event of a pandemic or any other exceptional circumstances threatening their safety and/or that of their families and communities.

Par conséquent, le Comité recommande :

Que la Chambre des communes mette sur pied un système électronique de vote sécurisé pour la tenue des votes dans le cadre des séances virtuelles, et ce, aussitôt que possible, afin de garantir le droit des députés à voter en toute sécurité en cas de pandémie ou dans toute autre circonstance exceptionnelle menaçant leur sécurité et/ou celle de leurs proches et de leurs communautés.

Note that these procedure changes are intended to be temporary.

(b) Temporary nature of procedural changes

Witnesses appearing before the Committee have been unanimous in their viewpoint that any changes made to the procedures and practices of the House of Commons should be temporary and made in response to the challenges of the COVID-19 outbreak.[85]

[85] For example, see House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Evidence, 1st Session, 43rd Parliament, Meeting 11, 23 April 2020, 1240 (Emmett Macfarlane, University of Waterloo); and [Hon. Anthony Rota, Speaker of the House of Commons], 1120. [original footnote link: [85]]

UPDATE – Committee Tasked with Additional Remote Voting Report

Following the submission of the recommendations, the Government has tasked the committee with producing a report on how to enact remote voting by June 23, 2020.

Considerations for Remote and Internet Voting

See the end of this post for the current process of Putting the Question, as it is called.  I will walk through each of the voting scenarios as it applies to remote presence and then Internet voting.  The basic consideration is that anonymous or mass voting (simultaneous shouting) is not possible online.

Speaker puts the question.

  • No dissenting voice – seems like this could be done by videoconference as long as everyone is present and the technology is working
  • Dissenting voice – Voice division – Since this is literally all of the members shouting at once, I don’t see how this could be done by videoconference.
  • Dissenting voice – Members call: “On division” – I can’t actually figure out how this works.  I think this is a way to anonymously register dissent concerning a voice vote – if so, there is no way to reproduce this feature in a simple online system.
  • Recorded division – All members in favour rise as their places and their names are called, then all members opposed rise in their places and their names are called – this could easily be done on videoconference as long as everyone is present and the technology is working.  Maybe not by having them stand, but by having some visual or text signal, e.g. they could literally raise their hand or (much less preferably) make some other indication in the chat channel.
    • A recorded division may be conducted in one of two ways: as a party vote or as a row-by-row vote. Generally, a recorded division on an item of government business is conducted as a party vote, and a recorded division on an item of Private Members’ Business is conducted as a row-by-row vote.  (i.e. this is the same procedure, just with people called in a different order depending on whether it is a party vote or a row-by-row vote.)

So I’m not actually convinced you need Internet voting.  Except for voice division, you could just call on people one by one over videoconference the same way we already do when they are physically present in the House.

UPDATE 2020-06-02: There are additional procedure considerations when conducting remote voting.  For example, I don’t know of any way to challenge the results of a division once the Clerk has tallied the votes.  In the UK, they gave the Speaker the authority to re-run a remote division if necessary, if issues were detected.

The Speaker has the authority to call a revote:

If problems in the conduct of a remote division which might have affected the result are reported after the result is announced, the Speaker may declare the division to be null and void and make arrangements for it to be re-run.

END UPDATE

I’m not sure what the driver for introducing electronic voting (Internet voting) would be, other than the hope that it would be faster than calling on people over videoconference.  It means a big and rapid investment in authentication infrastructure, web infrastructure, and software design.

The UK implementation of “remote voting” built on an entire pre-existing infrastructure, was developed by a dedicated UK Parliamentary Digital Service, and still encountered challenges.  I’m not sure that Canada has the same technology infrastructure in place, and we definitely don’t have a Canadian Parliamentary Digital Service.

Hidden inside that single word “secure” in the Procedure Committee (PROC) recommendation is a whole world of technology complexity.

Need for a Separate Report and Modern Software Development Practices

There really needs to be a separate, dedicated, technology-focused report just on electronic voting (Internet voting) for the House of Commons that gives more specific guidance including an assessment of risks and risk mitigations.

UPDATE 2020-05-27: The committee has been called upon to produce a report on how to enact remote voting by June 23, 2020.  See my blog post How to enact remote voting for the Canadian House of Commons for more information. END UPDATE

As I indicated in my post about the UK system, you have to consider a variety of complex issues when introducing a voting system.

Considerations for a voting system include the chain-of-custody, as multiple systems are most likely involved with the transmission and counting of the vote, concerns about auditability and concerns about security, as well as usability.

Auditability is a really challenging one.  Basically either each individual MP would have to check that their vote has been counted based on their intention, and even then, they’re no longer all standing in a room where they can see how other members voted.  Unlike counting people in a room, online it’s hard if not impossible to get a good sense of whether the vote count reflects the votes cast.

Auditability considerations are somewhat mitigated by the party system, in which votes are whipped and party whips will check to see that members voted as expected.  Auditability is an even greater concern in the case of a free vote.

Usability is a key consideration for any new interface.  It only took a day for some UK members to vote the opposite way from what they intended.

Security is also a challenging one given that computers can lie, with customized malware capable of showing one result (e.g. a Yea vote) on screen and sending another (e.g. a Nay vote) to the voting software.  In that light, it’s worth mentioning that every month there is a Patch Tuesday, with May’s software updates including both Microsoft and Adobe releasing patches for vulnerabilities (“A remote attacker could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.”)

There is also a larger question, deeply related to human intentionality, about the physical and psychological differences between literally standing to be counted versus tapping a square on a screen.

The House would do well to draw upon the Government’s existing guidance for modern software development, including the Digital Standards.  The Standards surface a number of key approaches that help mitigate the risks of software development, including:

  • Design with users
    Research with users to understand their needs and the problems we want to solve. Conduct ongoing testing with users to guide design and development.
  • Iterate and improve frequently
    Develop services using agile, iterative and user-centred methods. Continuously improve in response to user needs. Try new things, start small and scale up.
  • Work in the open by default
    Share evidence, research and decision making openly. Make all non-sensitive data, information, and new code developed in delivery of services open to the outside world for sharing and reuse under an open licence.
  • Address security and privacy risks
  • Empower staff to deliver better services
    Make sure that staff have access to the tools, training and technologies they need. Empower the team to make decisions throughout the design, build and operation of the service.
  • Collaborate widely
    Create multidisciplinary teams with the range of skills needed to deliver a common goal. Share and collaborate in the open. Identify and create partnerships which help deliver value to users.

Briefs Submitted

You can see all the briefs submitted in evidence to this study.  The only ones relevant to electronic voting (Internet voting) :

  • two voting technology vendor submissions
  • a submission including expert cybersecurity considerations explaining why unlike for a general election, Internet voting is feasible for Parliamentary voting

Parliamentary voting, on the other hand, is entirely workable from a cybersecurity perspective because it differs from general elections in three crucial ways.

First, an MP’s vote is a matter of public record, which makes it possible to verify it was correctly recorded and counted. Second, the federal government has the resources to provide MPs with the necessary cybersecurity infrastructure to ensure the protection of electronic information. Third, the government has the capacity to provide MPs training on procedures necessary to ensure votes are successfully entered into the record.

  • a non-technical submission from Gregory Tardi that outlines some reasonable considerations

Bearing in mind the ever-present failings of computer-based systems, if the House decides to function in a virtual fashion, perhaps even on a temporary basis, it should gather two fundamental and vital working groups from among the staff of the House Administration:

  • a working group of legal advisors to engage in liaison with like-minded jurisdictions, especially from Commonwealth states, designed to exchange information on the best ways to ensure democracy, constitutionalism and the maintenance of parliamentary privilege, and
  • a working group of technical experts, whose principal task would be to design failsafe methods for the protection of MPs identity in their access to the system.

In order to render a virtual functioning of the House of Commons viable, the highest grade of hardware and software should be placed at the disposal of Member. Particular care should be taken in methodologies to verify each participating Member’s identity. In its preparation for the 43rd federal general election, Elections Canada worked extensively to prevent computer intrusion and fraud. That experience could be put to good use here.

If you find it surprising that only 1 of 14 briefs submitted would have independent expert technology analysis, the normal number of briefings from computer science subject matter experts submitted to a Canadian Parliamentary committee is sadly zero. Witnesses called to present at committee and briefs submitted are overwhelmingly individuals with political science or social science backgrounds.  In the 2016 Special Committee on Electoral Reform (ERRE) they called a single computer science expert in online voting, out of 196 witnesses called, even though online voting was a specific subject of consideration for the committee.

Canadian Parliamentary committees need to do better in seeking out computer science subject matter expertise.  On this topic, I will mention I have a list of over a dozen experts with Internet voting and computer security expertise.

Background – Electronic Voting Within the House

The issue of electronic voting within the House has been considered.  House of Commons Procedure and Practice, Third Edition, 2017 (referred to as Bosc and Gagnon) says basically there hasn’t been any recent action to implement electronic voting.

Chapter 12 – The Process of Debate – Decisions of the House – Calling the Vote and Announcing the Results – The Issue of Electronic Voting

The Issue of Electronic Voting

Proposals to install a system for electronic voting in the Chamber have been made over the years with a view to improving the management of the time of the House.382 In 1985, the Second Report of the McGrath Committee recommended computerized electronic voting, but the matter was not taken up by the House.383 In 1995, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, noting that the practices of deferring several votes to the same day and time, and of applying results of votes, had “greatly speeded up the voting process”, recommended that the House not proceed at that time to a system of electronic voting.384 In 1997, the Committee briefly returned to consideration of the question of electronic voting, but did not report to the House.385 In 2003, a special committee endorsed the principle of electronic voting in the Chamber and recommended in two of its reports to the House that the necessary electronic infrastructure be installed in the Chamber during the summer of 2004.386 While the greater part of this infrastructure was installed as recommended, no further action has been taken in respect of electronic voting.

I’ve left in place the footnote links to the Procedure and Practice website, rather than pulling them all out within this blog post.

I have written a previous blog post considering this issue: Electronic voting in the Canadian House of Commons.

House of Commons Administration Report

UPDATE 2020-05-21 & 2020-06-03: Two briefs were submitted by the Speaker.

May 11, 2020 –  Virtual Chamber: A Report in Response to the Statement of the Speaker of the House on April 8, 2020 – May 7, 2020 – Version 2.0 (PDF) is available.  It has a brief section related to remote voting under the heading “Decision making” on page 18.  It’s a report from the House of Commons Administration on their considerations and analysis of what is possible; it’s not the same as a committee report.

A followup brief – May 13, 2020 – Virtual Chamber: key procedural issues (PDF).

END UPDATE

Putting the Question

As one might expect, Bosc and Gagnon provides a detailed explanation of the voting process in the House.

Chapter 12 – The Process of Debate – Decisions of the House – Putting the Question

You can read all the details there, but I have to include the marvelous Figure 12.3 Putting the Question.  Law as code, if you will.

Figure 12.3 Putting the Question
Image depicting, in a series of boxes linked by lines, the steps required for the House to make a decision on a question. It begins with debate concluding, followed by the Speaker putting the question, then listing options for voice votes or recorded divisions. If necessary, the Speaker casts a deciding vote. At the end, the Speaker declares that the motion has been adopted or rejected.

Electronic voting in the Canadian House of Commons

While I am not a fan of electronic voting in the House of Commons, it would be possible to design a system that would mitigate potential risks, whereas it is not possible to design a system that will adequately mitigate the risks of Internet voting in a public election.  Comparing the two may be illustrative.

Voting in the House of Commons

A decision on a motion before the House can be made with no dissenting voices, in which case the motion is adopted and no division is taken.[255] When there are dissenting voices, a vote (or division) is taken. This can be either a voice vote or a recorded vote[256] where the House is called upon to divide into the “yeas” and the “nays”.[257]

above from House of Commons Procedure and Practice – Decisions of the House

When consensus isn’t heard on a voice vote, votes are cast by individual Members of Parliament (I think this is sometimes called “on division”).  The vote is cast by MPs standing one-by-one and saying their vote out loud.

Three key things about these votes:

  • they are not anonymous
  • they are not secret
  • they can be coerced

Because an individual MP stands up and states their vote in front of everyone, their votes are not anonymous or secret. Because of that, their vote can additionally be coerced, which is to say they can be incentivized to vote a particular way, and then rewarded or punished once they cast their vote (the Canada the system of whipped votes, with a Party Whip, is the very definition of coerced votes).

Designing Electronic Voting in the House of Commons

UPDATE 2020-06-04: This post is about electronic voting when physically in the House of Commons chamber.  For remote voting, see blog post Set Up a Secure Electronic Voting System for the Canadian House of Commons.

END UPDATE

Technologically this is straightforward.  Each MP should be able to vote once and only once.  Everyone should be able to see the individual votes.  It should be hard to vote the opposite of how you intend.  Preferably the MP should be physically present in the House, ideally at their seat.  No other MP should be able to cast a vote on another’s behalf.

The obvious way to do this is low-technology.  Have voting buttons at each MP’s seat.  Have them well-designed, ideally physically separated with different shapes and colours to distinguish the yes vote from the no vote, so that you don’t press the wrong button by accident.  You could have e.g. a round green yes button on the left hand of the seat, and a red octagonal no button on the right hand side of the seat.

In case you think people can’t make mistakes:

In May 2010, however, [Paula] Fletcher accidentally voted against a proposal to install bike lanes on University Avenue in downtown Toronto. The proposal failed on a 15-13 vote. She said she had intended to vote in favour of the proposal and cited fatigue and city hall technology for her mis-vote.[15][16]

above from Wikipedia – Paula Fletcher

Now, the question becomes whether MPs still vote one-by-one or whether they now all vote simultaneously.  One-by-one is much better as you get much more time for everyone involved to check that the vote was cast as expected.  But this doesn’t save much time over standing to vote.  The inclination will be for simultaneous votes.  In this case, there would ideally be a display (e.g. red and green lights, right and left) at each MP’s station to show how they just voted, plus a screen listing each MP and their vote, plus a summary screen, plus possibly a line display in front of the MP displaying either YES/OUI or NO/NON back to them.  This is so that individual MPs can verify their vote was cast as intended and also so that MPs can check on one another.

In case you think MPs won’t be tempted to vote for absent members, watch this US video of representatives voting for absent members:

So the system should have individual member voting buttons activated if they are (at least) physically in the chamber and (ideally) physically at their desk. This means a lot of monitoring who goes in and out. And there needs to be frequent testing of the buttons. And they should be hard-wired and electro-mechnical, with a sensory and possibly audible click when pushed, in addition to lighting up.

Hard-wired is to make them impossible to tamper with from outside. Electro-mechanical is because you want them to last a really long time, which means they have to be outside the very rapid technology obsolence cycle of computing devices. You do still need some central counting and display technology, but it should also be very very simple.

You need to make sure that the final vote tallies match the individual votes as cast.  Preferably through both verification in the House as well as after-the-fact spot checks (independent audits) by third parties checking the votes cast against the tallies.

When casting a vote, you want a mechanical click, because you want intentionality.
This has nothing to do with technology, it’s about humans.
Standing and speaking your vote is a very strong human statement. It is a physical risk, it is a social statement. It’s a very deep part of how humans behave. “Stand and be counted” is an expression for a reason. Standing up and making a statement requires a very deliberate choice.

It’s very hard to capture that level of accountability and deliberation in any kind of electronic voting situation. The best I can do is to have the voting system be physical with feedback, so that you have to be quite deliberate about pushing the button.

What you absolutely don’t want is iPads with wifi.
What they will want to do is iPads with wifi. Because innovation! progress!

iPads with wifi is terrible on many many fronts. In brief:

  • it introduces the risk that the voting system can be attacked from outside
  • it introduces a constant cycle of technological maintenance and upgrades, with associated never-ending costs and ever-escalating risks
  • it introduces the risk that MPs can vote without being physically in the chamber
  • it introduces the risk that MPs can vote for other members
  • it removes the physical intention that standing to vote embodies
  • it moves the vote into a noisy distraction space where people are used to clicking without consequences: to buy things, to select news headlines, to play music, etc.
  • it introduces a huge potential distraction in front of MPs, unless the iPad is extremely locked-down in terms of its features

To mitigate this you could physically wire the iPads into the desks and have the vote only possible to be cast by transmission over the iPad connector, but there is pretty much zero chance they would design it this way.

If it’s not iPads with wifi, the temptation will be to use “clickers” because they are easy to procure.  However clicker systems break down all the time.

The error was caused by the electronic clickers used in voting, said  General Synod Chancellor David Jones.

above from Anglican Journal –  Voting error reveals Anglican same-sex marriage motion passed after all

All of the voting data would have to be published as open data (which it already is), ideally with analysis ongoing to check for anomalies.

Summary of Electronic Voting in the House of Commons

In summary, it is possible to design a system because you can have visible indicators and checks.  Each individual MP can check that their vote was properly cast and counted, and the House as a whole can observe the votes and validate them against expectations.  Because the vote is not secret and not anonymous, it’s possible for multiple individuals and groups to validate the vote.

I’m not saying it’s a good idea.  I’m saying you could design it to mitigate risks.

My ideal system would have:

  • one-by-one voting
  • clear indication of how each member has voted, with cross-checking
  • design that limits the possibility of accidentally voting the wrong way
  • design that forces you to be very intentional and physically aware of your vote

The current stand-and-speak division voting has these properties, but a very-well-designed electromechanical system could come close.

Internet Voting in a Public Election

Internet voting (or voting in a public election in general) is very different from voting in the House of Commons.  Voting is secret.  If only the Elections Act said it that clearly.  Oh wait, it does:

Secrecy
Secret vote
163 The vote is secret.

above from Canada Elections Act
Sidebar: The Canada Elections Act is beautiful. Readable and extremely well-designed to mitigate risks to voting. END Sidebar

Not only is the vote secret, but individual voters are not permitted to share how they voted, in order to limit coercion.

  • Secrecy at the poll
    (2) Except as provided by this Act, no elector shall

    • (a) on entering the polling station and before receiving a ballot, openly declare for whom the elector intends to vote;
    • (b) show his or her ballot, when marked, so as to allow the name of the candidate for whom the elector has voted to be known; or
    • (c)before leaving the polling station, openly declare for whom the elector has voted.

above from Canada Elections Act

Votes used to be cast by individual voters stating their vote out loud (the exact system that is still in use in the House of Commons). This led to voters being coerced in many different ways. You can see more about the history of how we ended up with secret ballots in Andrew Appel’s presentation and my presentation.

Therefore in order to meet the same standards we have for paper ballots, the Internet vote in a public election must be

  • secret
  • anonymous
  • difficult to coerce

It is, simply put, not possible to do this with Internet voting systems today.  It may never be possible.  The risks can’t be mitigated in the way that they can for the very different requirements of non-secret, non-anonymous, possible-to-coerce electronic voting in the House.

Background

In case you’re wondering why this discussion comes up now, electronic voting in the House is proposed in the March 2017 document Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons.