There is currently no Internet voting in Switzerland, primarily due to security issues.
It’s complicated to write about Internet voting in Switzerland for several reasons:
- Switzerland has a political structure of cantons, voting is done by canton with different systems in each canton
- Switzerland does not have a history of voting privacy; historically and in a few locations even today voting is done by a public show of hands
- Switzerland has many votes throughout the year on what are basically referenda
- Switzerland has a good, but quite complex, set of regulations around Internet voting
Internet voting has been an option in some cantons. I believe testing began in 2004. Because of the Swiss Internet voting regulations, as best I understand the maximum percentage that can vote online is 30%. (More than 30% voting online triggers additional requirements.)
The 30% figure is a bit misleading however. Because only some cantons participated in online voting trials, it was open to just 3.8% of the overall electorate in September 2018 (and now is not available at all).1
As indicated above, the absolute number of voters was always relatively small. In my own analysis of reports available online, I find that under 5% of the eligible voters vote online, representing 200,000 or fewer votes per voting period. (My understanding is that voters have to register in advance to vote online; it’s not clear to me whether the numbers in these reports are just the number of registrations, or the actual number of ballots cast online.)
The map below summarizes the online voting testing that has been done by cantons, as well as making it clear that there is currently no online voting at all (in French « Pour l’instant, il n’est pas possible de voter par voie électronique en Suisse », roughly translated “For the moment, it is not possible to vote online in Switzerland”).
Above map from Chancellerie fédérale ChF > Vote électronique.
Research indicates that turnout did not increase, specifically youth turnout didn’t increase.2
2 Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland, by Micha Germann and Uwe Serdült in Electoral Studies, Volume 47, June 2017, Pages 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.03.001
Background on Geneva and Swiss Post
Swiss Post developed two systems, including a new one with a third-party for-profit private vendor. The old system is being discontinued. As required by Swiss law, the new system was put to a public intrusion test (with restrictive conditions) and the source code was made available (with restrictive conditions).
Swiss Post makes a remarkable claim about the new system.
The new system with universal verifiability was subject to a public intrusion test (PIT) in spring 2019. During the test, it withstood attacks from over 3,000 international hackers.
This is at best misleading.
The conditions on both the general testing and the availability of source code were restrictive.
- Terms, Conditions and Code of Conduct – Public Intrusion Test
- Electronic Voting Solution Source Code Access Agreement (PDF)
There was not in any sense either unrestricted public testing nor unrestricted publicly available open source code.
And, through access to the source code outside of the restrictive agreement, three serious flaws in the system were found.
You can read e.g. Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System by Kim Zetter.
Three reports are available about the Swiss Post system from the Swiss government site, two in English and one in German.
- Final report Locher, Haenni and Koenig (English) – (PDF, 1 MB, 29.07.2019) – Members of the e-voting research group at the Bern University of Applied Sciences BFH (Philipp Locher, Rolf Haenni, Reto E. Koenig): analysis of the cryptographic implementation of the Swiss Post voting protocol
- Final report Teague and Pereira (English) – (PDF, 731 kB, 29.07.2019) – Vanessa Teague (The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia) and Olivier Pereira (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium): analysis of the cryptographic protocol and its implementation according to the system specification
- Final report Oneconsult (German) – (PDF, 303 kB, 29.07.2019) – Oneconsult: Review of Swiss Post’s operational security measures